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Abstract
Intellectual humility has attracted attention in both philosophy and psychology.
Philosophers have clarified the nature of intellectual humility as an epistemic
virtue; and psychologists have developed scales for measuring people’s intellec-
tual humility. Much less attention has been paid to the potential effects of
intellectual humility on people’s negative attitudes and to its relationship with
prejudice-based epistemic vices. Here we fill these gaps by focusing on the
relationship between intellectual humility and prejudice. To clarify this relation-
ship, we conducted four empirical studies. The results of these studies show three
things. First, people are systematically prejudiced towards members of groups
perceived as dissimilar. Second, intellectual humility weakens the association
between perceived dissimilarity and prejudice. Third, more intellectual humility
is associated with more prejudice overall. We show that this apparently paradox-
ical pattern of results is consistent with the idea that it is both psychologically and
rationally plausible that one person is at the same time intellectually humble,
epistemically virtuous and strongly prejudiced.
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1 Introduction
Imagine that you are an acclaimed psychologist. You have won many international
prizes and you have an unmatched knowledge of social psychology. You are aware of
your sharp intelligence and knowledge, but you do not cast yourself before other
colleagues and laypeople to show off your superior intellectual skills. You do not care
about the social or economic status you may gain due to your knowledge and
intellectual skills. You are generally open-minded, tolerant and modest; you have many
interests beyond psychology and a keen desire to learn new things; in fact, you believe
that there is always something worthwhile to learn from other people, from their
knowledge and viewpoints about the world. You also believe that you are ignorant
of a great many topics and that you have several intellectual limitations. You are
convinced that it is okay to ask for help when you do not know how to solve a
problem—including problems in psychological science—or to acknowledge you made
a mistake—including mistakes in addressing questions in social psychology.
According to a family of virtue approaches to epistemology (Code 1987;
Montmarquet 1993; Zagzebski 1996, 155; Roberts and Wood 2003; Sosa 2007), these
traits constitute an intellectual virtue, the virtue of intellectual humility (for reviews see
Snow 2018; Tangney 2000). Because intellectual humility distinctively furthers the
attainment of epistemic goods, it differs from other forms of humility, which concern,
more broadly, one’s relationship towards the world or other people (Bommarito 2018).
Intellectual humility would distinctively help people figure out how to appropriately
pursue and weigh epistemic goods like understanding, knowledge and true belief. For
example, other things being equal, if you have a higher degree of intellectual humility
than another person, then you will have a stronger intrinsic motivation to learn new
things from other people, you will acknowledge your intellectual limitations more
readily and you will recognize the merits of others people’s views more easily, even
when these people have views and values that differ substantially from your own.
But now suppose that you cannot stand philosophers. While you feel cold towards
philosophers as a social group, you perceive them as very dissimilar to your own group
of psychologists. You believe that their views about the world and values are very
different from your own. Sometimes you interact with philosophers, but you generally
prefer to avoid them, even though this means you are going to miss out on relevant
informants about philosophical questions you care about. In short, you are prejudiced
towards philosophers; and, according to many approaches to epistemology, being
prejudiced is an intellectual vice that can impede the attainment of epistemic goods.
For example, prejudice may reduce your intrinsic motivation to find things out, to
recognize your own intellectual limitations and to acknowledge the merits of other
people’s views (Zagzebski 1996, 152; Cassam 2016; Kidd 2017). Prejudice may
specifically lead you “to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word”,
whereby you unjustly wrong other people in their capacity as knowers (Fricker 2007, 1).
Perhaps, you find nothing puzzling about the psychologist we have described. After
all, intellectual humility might be specific to just some domains of inquiry, topics or
worldviews shared by certain social groups. For example, if you are intellectually
humble in the domain of social psychology, that does not mean that you must be
intellectually humble in any other domain of inquiry, or towards any view shared by
any social group (Davis et al. 2016; Hoyle et al. 2016).
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Although intellectual humility could be a domain-specific character trait, there are
three sets of considerations that call into question both the psychological plausibility
and the rational possibility that the social psychologist we have described is at the same
time intellectually humble, epistemically virtuous and strongly prejudiced.1 First,
‘being prejudiced’ and ‘being intellectually humble’ seem to have opposite meaning.
Focusing on synonyms and antonyms of ‘intellectual humility’ from the thesaurus.com
database, Christen et al. (2014) found that ‘prejudiced’ is one of the most common
words opposite in meaning to ‘intellectually humble’ (see also Alfano et al. 2017).
Similarly, Gregg et al. (2008) surveyed everyday conceptions of the meaning of ‘being
modest’. They found that prototypical features of individuals described as ‘modest’
include ‘being humble’ and ‘not prejudiced’. So, there is evidence that being prejudiced
is ordinarily considered to be one distinctive way in which people can fail to be
intellectually humble.
Second, several philosophical accounts of intellectual humility predict that intellec-
tually humble people are overall less prejudiced than people who lack intellectual
humility. According to Church and Samuelson’s (2017) doxastic account, for example,
intellectual humility is a domain-general trait, which consists in “the virtue of accu-
rately tracking what one could non-culpably take to be the positive epistemic status of
one’s own beliefs” (25).2 On this account, people’s degree of intellectual humility
would be determined by their higher order attitudes towards both their own views and
attitudes, and the views and attitudes of other people (see also Hazlett 2012; Church
2016). While Church and Samuelson (2017, Ch. 5) suggest that intellectual humility
might function as a corrective of many cognitive biases, they claim that failure at
intellectual humility “feeds prejudice” (Church and Samuelson 2017, 234–5). If this is
true, then we should expect that intellectual humility and prejudice are negatively
correlated across many different domains.
Another prominent account of intellectual humility is Whitcomb et al.’s (2015)
limitation owning account. According to this account, intellectual humility is a
domain-general trait, which “consists in proper attentiveness to, and owning of, one’s
intellectual limitations” (520). People’s degree of intellectual humility would then be
determined by their intellectual abilities, particularly by their attention and also by their
attitudes towards their own intellectual limitations (see also Rushing 2013). Whitcomb
et al. (2015) explain that owning to one’s intellectual limitations “characteristically”
involves a series of motivational and cognitive dispositions, including the disposition
“to care about their limitations and take them seriously” (519). If one person is disposed
“to care about” and “take seriously” their own intellectual limitations, such as one’s
ignorance about certain topics, difficulties in reasoning about certain problems and
unreliable memory, then this person should be less prejudiced towards diverse groups
of people and their different views and values (cf., Driver 1989; Roberts and Wood
2007; Spiegel 2012; Tanesini 2018, for accounts emphasizing the social-motivational
dimension of intellectual humility). If this is true, then we should once again expect a
1 By ‘psychological plausibility’, we mean the plausibility actual people are genuinely intellectually humble
but also systematically prejudiced towards others. By ‘rational possibility’, we mean the possibility a person
can rationally be both intellectually humble and strongly prejudiced.
2 Humility, however, does not feature on Aristotle’s list of virtues, but the ideal of metriòtes (moderation) is a
close kin (Aristotle, 350 BCE/2009). Next to that, when considering the New Testament, the usage of arete
(virtue or excellence) is used considerably less than tapeinosis (lowness, spiritual abasement).
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negative association between people’s degree of intellectual humility and the strength
of their prejudice towards members of groups perceived as having different views. So,
based on existing philosophical accounts, we can hypothesize that if I am prejudiced
towards members of a group, then I am liable to exhibit intellectual vice towards them,
for example in the form of testimonial epistemic injustice as we explain below. This is
not a conceptual or necessary connection, but a highly plausible empirical generaliza-
tion we set out to test.
Third and finally, existing literature in social psychology shows that the general trait
of intellectual humility is associated with such personality traits as “Openness to
experience”, “Conscientiousness” and “Agreeableness” of the Five-Factor Model
(McCrae and Costa 1987), and the “Honesty-Humility” dimension of the HEXACO
model (Ashton and Lee 2005). Openness, Agreeableness and Honest-humility, in
particular, tend to be related to lower levels of prejudice (Sibley and Duckitt 2008;
Sibley et al. 2010). Intellectual Humility scales also tend to be moderately related to
tolerance of other people and their viewpoints, to lower levels of authoritarianism (e.g.,
Krumrei-Mancuso 2018) and dogmatism (e.g., Leary et al. 2017), which are two
constructs that are often linked with prejudice and epistemic vice (Sibley and Duckitt
2008; Cassam 2016).
Specifically, Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse (2016) developed the Comprehensive
Intellectual Humility scale, which defines intellectual humility as “a nonthreatening
awareness of one’s intellectual fallibility” (210). Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse’s (2016)
operationalized this definition with four subscales that are meant to tap distinct facets of
intellectual humility: “Openness to revising one’s viewpoints”, “Lack of overconfi-
dence about one’s knowledge”, “Respect for the viewpoints of others” and “Lack of
threat in the face of intellectual disagreements” (Table 1).
Leary et al. (2017) propose an alternative scale. Defining intellectual humility as “an
appropriate attentiveness to limitations in the evidentiary basis of [one’s] beliefs and to
one’s own limitations in obtaining and evaluating relevant information” (Leary et al.
2017, 793), their scale includes items like “I question my own opinions, positions, and
viewpoints because they could be wrong” and “I recognize the value in opinions that
are different from my own”. In both of these scales, intellectually humble people are
expected to be non-threatened by different views, open to revising one’s views, and
respecting and valuing other’s differing views.
These links with personality traits and worldviews associated with openness and
tolerance provide us with converging evidence that existing intellectual humility scales
construe intellectual humility as an intellectual virtue and that we should expect a
negative association between people’s degree of intellectual humility and the strength
of their prejudice (Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse 2016; Leary et al. 2017).
In particular, we should expect that intellectual humility buffers the association
between disagreeing with a person perceived as very different from ourselves and
being prejudiced towards that person. The association between perceived attitudinal
dissimilarity and prejudice is one of the most robust findings in social psychology.
Early work focused on the relationship between perceived similarity and liking (Byrne
1969). This work consistently showed that when an individual was described as having
more similar beliefs and attitudes to participants, the participants liked the individual
more (for a meta-analysis see Montoya et al. 2008). Contemporary theoretical perspec-
tives are also consistent with this idea (e.g., Wynn 2016), although they often assess the
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links between perceived dissimilarity and prejudice (i.e. the opposites of similarity and
liking). For example, multiple lines of research in social psychology have examined
how perceiving that members of a given group hold different values and worldviews is
associated with prejudice towards those group members (Haddock et al. 1993; Henry
and Reyna 2007; Riek et al. 2006; De Rooij et al. 2018; Sidanius et al. 2016; Stephan
et al. 2000; Stephan et al. 1998; Velasco González et al. 2008). Some of these
contemporary lines of research explicitly build on the earlier work of Byrne (1969),
and, overall, they demonstrate that the perceived attitudinal and value dissimilarity of a
target group is associated with prejudice towards that target group (Brandt et al. 2015;
Brandt and Crawford in press).
There is, however, good reason to qualify the hypothesis that intellectual humility
buffers the positive association between perceived attitudinal dissimilarity and preju-
dice. Consider a trait correlated with intellectual humility, Openness to experience. As
noted above, Openness tends to be associated with lower levels of prejudice (e.g.,
Sibley and Duckitt 2008). However, social psychologists have recently pointed out that
the research supporting this association typically only measures prejudice towards a
limited number of target groups and these target groups tend to be relatively uncon-
ventional or low status groups (e.g., racial minorities, members of the LGBTQ com-
munity, immigrants) (Brandt et al. 2015; Brandt and Crawford 2019; Crawford and
Brandt 2019). When the range of target groups is expanded to include conventional
target groups (e.g., religious people, political conservatives), people who are high in
Table 1 Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse’s (2016) 22-items scale
Independence of Intellect and Ego
I feel small when others disagree with me on topics that are close to my heart
When someone contradicts my most important beliefs, it feels like a personal attack
When someone disagrees with ideas which are important to me, it feels as though I’m being attacked
I tend to feel threatened when others disagree with me on topics that are close to my heart
When someone disagrees with ideas that are important to me, it makes me feel insignificant
Openness to revising one’s viewpoints
I am open to revising my important beliefs in the face of new information
I am willing to change my position on an important issue in the face of good reasons
I am willing to change my opinions on the basis of compelling reason
I have at times changed opinions that were important to me, when someone showed me I was wrong (25)
I’m willing to change my mind once it’s made up about an important topic
Lack of Intellectual Overconfidence
My ideas are usually better than other people’s ideas
For the most part, others have more to learn from me than I have to learn from them
On important topics, I am not likely to be swayed by the viewpoints of others
Listening to perspectives of others seldom changes my important opinions
When I am really confident in a belief, there is a very little chance that this belief is wrong
I would rather rely on my own knowledge about most topics, than turn to others for expertise
Respect for other’s viewpoints
I can have great respect for someone even when we don’t see eye-to-eye on important topics
I am willing to hear others out, even if I disagree with them
I welcome different ways of thinking about important topics
I respect that there are ways of making important decisions that are different from the way I make decisions
I can respect others, even if I disagree with them in important ways
Even when I disagree with others, I can recognize that they have sound points
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Openness appear to express prejudice towards these groups (Brandt et al. 2015). Said
another way, people both high and low in Openness tend to express prejudice, but
towards different groups. Moreover, the correlation between perceived dissimilarity
and prejudice was either not different or higher among people high in Openness
compared to those low in Openness. That is, although Openness is also expected to
index people’s openness to people with different views, the best evidence suggests that
this is not the case. This may also extend to intellectual humility, complicating its
relationship with prejudice and its status as an intellectual virtue.
In summary, on the basis of the linguistic, philosophical and psychological consid-
erations we have reviewed, we set out to test two hypotheses: first, that intellectual
humble people are generally less prejudiced than non-intellectually humble people;
second, that intellectual humility buffers the association between perceived dissimilar-
ity and prejudice.
We tested these hypotheses on the basis of data from four studies. In all four studies
we used Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse’s (2016) scale for measuring intellectual humil-
ity (henceforth, IH), which had previously shown high reliability. Consistently with
existing work in philosophy and psychology, we defined prejudice as a negative
evaluation of a group or an individual based on group membership (e.g., Aronson
et al. 2010; Begby 2013; Brown 2010; Crandall et al. 2002; Fricker 2007). Although
some forms of prejudice focus on particular types of target groups (e.g., low status
groups; Bergh et al. 2016) or on negative evaluations that are inaccurate or unjustified
(Allport 1954), our studies focused on the key psychological phenomenon, group-
based negative evaluations, as it occurs across a range of target groups. Understood in
terms of this key psychological phenomenon, prejudice has been characterized as an
epistemic vice that impedes the pursuit of epistemic goods (Anderson 2012; Battaly
2017; Cassam 2016). Having negative feelings or attitudes towards others based on
their group membership is often associated with having the thought that the epistemic
status of their beliefs or their cognitive abilities are better than those of others (e.g.,
Alicke and Govorun 2005); and having negative feelings or attitudes towards others
based on their group membership can contribute to testimonial injustice, where hearers
give deflated credibility to the word of a speaker owing to identity prejudice on the
hearers’ part, overlooking the merits of others’ testimony (Fricker 2007, Ch. 2).
2 General Overview of the Studies
The four studies we conducted consisted of two parts. In the first part, we measured
participants’ levels of prejudice and perceived dissimilarity towards a variety of other
social groups. In the second part of the studies, we measured participants’ level of IH.
This allowed us to test if IH is associated with overall levels of prejudice and it
moderates the association between perceived dissimilarity and prejudice. Because of
the similarity between the four studies, we first describe the method of all of the studies,
noting their differences. Then, we describe the data analysis of each one of the four
studies separately. Importantly, because of the similarity of the four studies, we also
meta-analyzed the results and evaluated our two hypotheses on the basis of the pattern
of statistically significant associations we found in the meta-analysis. Data and code are
available here: https://osf.io/k5qmw/
Colombo M. et al.
3 Method
3.1 Participants
Study 1 Sixty students, from a large Dutch university, participated in this study in
exchange for course credit. We recruited as many participants as was possible during
the academic term. The participant pool consisted of students enrolled at the School of
Humanities, which includes both bachelor and master students studying topics from
Communication and Information Sciences to Philosophy. The average age was
22.3 years (SD = 4.6), as 90% of the participants were between the ages 18–24. 70%
of the sample were females and 80% were Dutch nationals with college-level profi-
ciency in English. The language of the study was English.
Study 2 Three hundred and one participants completed a survey on Amazon MTurk in
exchange for $0.50. We aimed to collect data from more than 250 participants, the
sample size at which correlations tend to stabilize (Schönbrodt and Perugini 2013).
Additional data was collected to guard against possible missing data. The average age
was 37.17 (SD = 12.0). 48% of the sample identified themselves as female. The task on
MTurk was opened to participants with an approval rate 90% or greater, 100 completed
HITs, and who were from the United States. The task took approximately 12 min.
Study 3 Three hundred and forty-seven participants completed a survey on Amazon
MTurk in exchange for $0.50. Additional participants were collected compared to
Study 2 because of the added experimental condition (see below). The average age
was 36.51 (SD = 11.24). 55.6% of the sample identified themselves as female. All
participants were proficient English speakers, and the survey was in English. The task
on MTurk was opened to participants with an approval rate 90% or greater, 100
completed HITs, and who were from the United States. The task took approximately
12 min.
Study 4 Four hundred and thirty-one participants took part in this study and were
recruited through Amazon MTurk in exchange for $0.50.3 The average age was 36.45
(SD = 11.39). 55% of the sample identified themselves as female. All participants had
proficiency in English, and the survey was conducted in English. The task on MTurk
was opened to participants with an approval rate 90% or greater, 100 completed HITs,
and who were from the United States. The task took approximately 12 min.
3.2 Procedure & Measures
Study 1 Each participant named between 10 and 15 social groups. A ‘social group’was
explicitly characterized in these terms: “People belong to social groups either because
they have a specific characteristic that is seen as typical for a social group or because
they have chosen to become part of a social group. Thus, some social groups are based
3 We collected additional data because we had leftover funds in our budget.
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on how people are, while others are based on how people behave or see the world”
(Koch et al. 2016, 678).
Next, participants reported the degree of their perceived attitudinal dissimilarity from
members of those groups and their level of prejudice towards members of those groups.
We measured participants’ prejudice towards the groups with “feeling thermometer”
ratings on a scale from 0 to 100 (0 = Very cold / Quite dislike; 100 = Very warm / Quite
like; 50 = Neutral / Neither dislike nor like). Feeling thermometers are a widely used,
reliable measure of prejudice in the psychology literature (Correll et al. 2010) that map
onto the definition of prejudice as negative evaluations based on group membership. To
measure dissimilarity, we asked each participant to rate on a scale from 0 to 100 the
extent to which they perceived each social group as having attitudes, values, or political
or social beliefs dissimilar from their own (0 = Not at all different; 100 = Very differ-
ent), a measure also previously used in psychological research (e.g., Brandt et al. 2015).
Finally, each participant completed Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse’s (2016) measure
of IH. Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse’s (2016) IH scale demonstrated good reliability
across the four studies (α’s range from .84 to .90). Its factors also showed good
reliability, with Cronbach’s alpha varying between .67 and .90 across the four studies.4
Study 2 Study 2 replicated Study 1 in a new sample.
Study 3 There were two key changes in this study. First, we changed how target groups
were determined. Unlike in Study 1 and 2, participants were not asked to report their
prejudice and dissimilarity regarding social groups they listed, but instead we used the
forty most frequently named social groups in the U.S. as the target groups (groups are
from Koch et al. 2016, 692) (see Table 2 for a list of groups. See Table S5 in the Online
Supplemental Materials for the correlation between intellectual humility and prejudice
for each of the groups).
Second, we introduced a within-participant manipulation of cognitive load in the
form of time pressure. The reason why we introduced this manipulation was to evaluate
Church and Samuelson’s (2017, 139) suggestion that epistemic vices might depend on
a breakdown between Type 1 and Type 2 psychological processes, where Type 1
processes are typically understood as being intuitive, fast, automatic, nonconscious,
effortless, contextualized, and error-prone, and Type 2 as reflective, slow, deliberate,
cogitative, effortful, decontextualized, and normatively correct (Sloman 1996;
Kahneman 2011; Evans and Stanovich 2013). By burdening participants’ cognitive
resources with time pressure while they were making judgements, we aimed at
reducing the possibility they could recruit Type 2 processes (e.g., De Neys 2006;
Evans and Curtis-Holmes 2005). We thus predicted participants under cognitive load
would show higher levels of prejudice and a stronger association between dissimilarity
ratings and prejudice scores, regardless of their level of IH. This experimental manip-
ulation did not have any significant effects and did not moderate any of the reported
associations. Therefore, we do not discuss it further.
4 In all studies, we also included items for an alternative IH scale that we were developing. However, given the
unvalidated status of our scale and the consistent results across scales, we only report the results using the
Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse scale.
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Study 4 This study differed from Study 3 in two ways. First, it did not include the
cognitive load manipulation. Second, half of the participants made ratings of the target
social groups sequentially, one group per page (See Table S6 in the Online Supple-
mental Materials for the correlation between intellectual humility and prejudice for each
of the groups). The other half of the group rated the social groups while they were all
presented on a single page. The reason why we introduced this difference was to ensure
the results from the first three studies did not depend on the difference in the display of
the social groups: sequentially vs. all on a single page. This experimental manipulation
did not have any significant effects and did not moderate any of the reported associ-
ations. Therefore, we do not discuss it further.
3.3 Results
Participants in our studies completed measures of dissimilarity and prejudice towards
multiple target groups. This means that the data are multilevel, with the measures of
dissimilarity and prejudice nested within participants. To assess how prejudice is
associated with dissimilarity and if IH moderates this association we need to take this
multilevel structure into account. Therefore, we used multilevel models.
In each study, we regressed prejudice on perceived dissimilarity (mean-centered within
participants), intellectual humility (grand-mean centered) and their interaction. The effect of
perceived dissimilarity tells the size and direction of the average linear relationship between
dissimilarity and prejudice within participants. The effect of intellectual humility tells us
whether people with higher or lower levels of IH express more prejudice overall (across all
of the groups). And the interaction effect tells us if the effect of dissimilarity on prejudice is
different in size for people higher or lower in IH.We conducted separate analyses for the full
IH scale and for each facet of the IH scale (5 analyses in total). The results for each individual
study are presented in Tables S1-S4 in the Online Supplemental Materials. Because the key
effect of interest is the same in each study, we conducted a fixed-effects meta-analysis using
the rma function in the R packagemetafor (Viechtbauer 2010) that computes ameta-analytic
average across all of the effects in each analysis reported in all four studies. This allows us to
focus on the effects that emerge consistently across studies and take advantage of all of the
available data when presenting the results. These results can be found in Table 3. See Goh
et al. (2016) for additional information about the benefits of such a “mini meta-analysis”.
Table 2 Forty most frequently named social groups of the U.S., used in Study 3 (Koch et al. 2016, 692)
Blacks Republicans Students Hippies Politicians
Whites Gays Lesbians Immigrants Jocks
Poor people Christians Women Atheists Hipsters
Asians Parents Teenagers Blue collar Celebrities
Rich people Conservatives Muslims Religious people Drug addicts
Hispanics Liberals Athletes Men Homosexuals
Democrats Elderly Nerds White collar Homeless people
Middle class people Transgender people Working class people Upper class people Jews
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Across all of the different models, we find that perceived dissimilarity is always
robustly and positively associated with prejudice. That is, the more a participant
perceives a group to have dissimilar attitudes and values, the more prejudice they
express towards that group. The effect size is equivalent to an approximately 37 point
(out of 100) difference in prejudice between a maximally similar vs. a maximally
dissimilar target group.5
We also find, across all of the different models, that more intellectual humility is
associated with more prejudice on average across all of the different target groups. That
is, the higher a participant score on the measures of intellectual humility, the more
prejudice they express on average across all of the groups. For the full scale, the effect
size is equivalent to an approximately 26 point (out of 100) difference in prejudice
between a maximally intellectually humble vs. a minimally intellectually humble
5 There are not agreed upon standardized effect sizes for multilevel models. Therefore, we report unstandard-
ized effect sizes and their translation into scale points for reference.
Table 3. Results Meta-analysis
Measure of IH Effect B SE
Full Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse’s (2016) IH
scale
Intercept 38.151 .448
Perceived Dissimilarity .370 .017***
Intellectual Humility 4.398 .635***
Perceived Dissimilarity * Intellectual
Humility
−.051 .024*
Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse Subscales
Independence of Intellect and Ego Intercept 38.169 .453
Perceived Dissimilarity .371 .017***
Intellectual Humility 1.284 .341***
Perceived Dissimilarity * Intellectual
Humility
−.016 .013
Openness of Revising One’s Viewpoints Intercept 38.161 .457
Perceived Dissimilarity .367 .017***
Intellectual Humility 1.357 .454**
Perceived Dissimilarity * Intellectual
Humility
−.032 .017
Respect for Other’s Viewpoints Intercept 38.115 .444
Perceived Dissimilarity .371 .017***
Intellectual Humility 3.809 .475***
Perceived Dissimilarity * Intellectual
Humility
−.050 .019**
Lack of Intellectual Overconfidence Intercept 38.182 .455
Perceived Dissimilarity .373 .017***
Intellectual Humility 1.848 .488***
Perceived Dissimilarity * Intellectual
Humility
−.002 .018
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
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participants. The effect size is smaller, but in the same direction, for the intellectual
humility subscales (range [7.7, 22.9] scale points). The higher people are on IH, the
colder they are likely to say they are towards other people from all of the other groups.
This result was unexpected.
Importantly, in two models, we find a significant negative interaction between
perceived dissimilarity and intellectual humility. This negative interaction means that
participants who have higher scores on the intellectual humility measures have weaker
associations between perceived dissimilarity and prejudice. For example, when con-
sidering the full IH scale the effect is B = .370 for people with average levels of IH,
consistent with the approximately 37 point (out of 100) difference in prejudice between
a maximally similar vs. a maximally dissimilar target group reported above. However,
for people who are 2-scale points (on a 7-point) scale above the average (i.e. more IH
than average), the effect is B = .268, consistent with the approximately 27 point (out of
100) difference in prejudice between a maximally similar vs. a maximally dissimilar
target group. For people who are 2-scale points (on a 7-point) scale below the average
(i.e. less IH than average), the effect is B = 0.472, consistent with the approximately 47
point (out of 100) difference in prejudice between a maximally similar vs. a maximally
dissimilar target group. That is, the link between dissimilarity and prejudice in people
particularly high in IH is approximately 43% of the strength of the association among
people particularly low in IH. People high in IH show a weaker connection between the
perception that a group shares different attitudes and values and their evaluation of that
group.
To help visualize these results, we plot the model estimate from Study 4 in Fig. 1.
We choose Study 4 for this illustration because its coefficients were the most similar to
the coefficients from the meta-analysis. We plot the effect of perceived dissimilarity on
prejudice for people both 1SD above and 1SD below the intellectual humility measure
using the full Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse’s (2016) IH scale (SD = .68). This plot
makes it clear that the effect of perceived dissimilarity on prejudice is flatter for people
with higher levels of intellectual humility compared to those with lower levels of
intellectual humility. This effect, however, is not because intellectual humility is related
to lower levels of prejudice for people they disagree with. Instead, the flatter association
between perceived dissimilarity and prejudice appears to be due to the greater prejudice
people with high levels of intellectual humility express towards people they agree with
(i.e. low levels of perceived dissimilarity).
4 Discussion
In four studies, we examined the relationships between three psychological variables:
people’s perceived dissimilarity of a target group, prejudice towards members of a
group and general intellectual humility. Overall, we found a consistent pattern of three
findings, which are relevant to evaluate our two hypotheses: first, intellectual humble
people are generally less prejudiced than non-intellectually humble people; and second,
intellectual humility buffers the association between perceived dissimilarity and
prejudice.
Across all four studies, participants’ perceived dissimilarity of other groups was
positively associated with their level of prejudice towards members of those groups.
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Second, across all studies, we found moderating effects of IH on the dissimilarity-
prejudice association. That is, intellectually humble participants showed a weaker
association between perceived dissimilarity and prejudice. Third and finally, across
all studies, we did not find any negative main effect of IH on people’s prejudice. That
is, we did not find any evidence that one’s level of IH is negatively associated with the
strength of one’s prejudice towards other individuals or groups. Instead, we consis-
tently found the opposite.
The first finding provides independent support to an already well-established asso-
ciation in social psychology. The other two findings bear out that people high in IH
present a weaker association between dissimilarity and prejudice than people low in IH,
and that people high in IH need not be in any way less prejudiced than people low in
IH.
The moderating effect of IH on the dissimilarity-prejudice link displays IH as an
epistemic virtue, as a character trait that promotes our pursuit of epistemic goods
(Zagzebski 1996, 155). In particular, this moderating effect can be explained by all
philosophical accounts of IH, and in particular by both Whitcomb et al.’s (2015)
limitation owing account and Church and Samuelson’s (2017) doxastic account. On
the limitation owing account, intellectually humble individuals, who are appropriately
aware of their intellectual limitations when the situation calls for it, are characteristi-
cally disposed to “care about” their own limitations and to “take them seriously”
(Whitcomb et al. 2015, 519). In our studies, this disposition could lead participants
to weaken the negative attitudes they have towards members of groups with dissimilar
views from theirs. IH people would tend to be less prejudiced towards members of
dissimilar groups, since this prejudice is likely to hinder responsible inquiry that
recognizes an obligation “to listen to what others say and to consider their ideas”
Fig. 1 Study 4: Estimate of the interaction between perceived dissimilarity and intellectual humility when
predicting prejudice
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(Whitcomb et al. 2015, 11). In this way, IH would promote responsible inquiry in the
face of attitudinal dissimilarity.
The moderating effect of IH on the dissimilarity-prejudice link is also consistent
with Church’s (2016) and Church and Samuelson’s (2017) doxastic account, where the
perceived dissimilarity with members of another social group does not lead the
intellectually humble to harbour a negative attitude towards those members and their
views. On the doxastic account, IH is basically the virtue of valuing our own (and other
people’s) beliefs as they should. If a disagreement with members of another group is
associated with a prejudice towards those members, and this prejudice can plausibly
lead one to give inappropriate weight to their beliefs, then IH should weaken the
association between dissimilarity and prejudice.
The finding that IH has no direct negative effect on overall levels of prejudice, but
on the contrary more IH is associated with more prejudice overall, is paradoxical when
juxtaposed with the finding that IH buffers the relationship between dissimilarity and
prejudice. First, this result raises general questions about the relationship between
intellectual virtues and vices. For example, the question of whether it is epistemically
good to aim at “epistemic sainthood”, where an epistemic saint can be defined as “a
person whose every epistemic action is as epistemically good as possible, a person, that
is, who is as epistemically worthy as can be” (cf., Wolf 1982, 419, where we have
replaced ‘moral’ with ‘epistemic’).
Second, this pattern of findings is consistent with the idea that IH is a dis-unified
character trait or cluster of attitudes that is always relative to a specific domain, and that
need not correlate with any other traits with similar epistemic valence. So, for example,
if you are intellectually humble in the domain of psychological science, that does not
mean you must be intellectually humble in other subject domains such as politics,
philosophy or geography (Hoyle et al. 2016). Or, if you are intellectually humble in a
certain domain, that does not mean you cannot be also prejudiced, narrow-minded or
pretentious in many other domains of inquiry or towards members of groups you find
dissimilar (Davis et al. 2016).
Third and most interestingly, if people high in IH show overall higher levels of
prejudice towards members of other social groups, we can still consider IH as a
genuine epistemic virtue. We can appreciate this point from different angles. Let’s
start by considering what ‘prejudice’ exactly means in a study like ours. Prejudice,
in the way it is typically defined and studied in social psychology (e.g., Brown
2010), is a negative evaluation of a group or of an individual based on stereotypes
and attributions (including epistemic attributions) that has no explicit normative
connotation. That’s exactly how ‘prejudice’ was defined and measured in our
study. Understood as this species of negative attitude, prejudice may be justified
in some cases. When it is justified, we should expect that people high in IH should
be more prejudiced overall. For example, the imaginary intellectually humble
social psychologist we described at the beginning of this paper might have good
evidence that philosophers are generally disagreeable, narcissistic and unreliable.
The psychologist might have gained this evidence from some previous personal
interaction with few philosophers working at their university, or from the testi-
mony of trustworthy friends who are knowledgeable of the epistemically appalling
status of some areas of professional philosophy. If this evidence is sufficiently
reliable and strong, then it would provide our social psychologist with a good
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reason to be prejudiced towards philosophers, and forego any epistemic good that
might accrue from interacting with them.
Even if our intellectually humble psychologist has no good evidence for the
prejudice towards philosophers, this prejudice need not impede the psychologist’s
pursuit of epistemic goods. Cassam (2016 167–9) describes the example of a journalist
prejudiced towards politicians, whose prejudice made him “less likely to be misled by
the pronouncements of mendacious politicians” (167). Because of, and not despite, this
prejudice, the journalist could acquire and retain knowledge in the face of actual,
widespread insincerity in the political realm. Although Cassam argues that ‘prejudice’
in this case would be better characterized as “an empirically grounded heuristics”, the
journalist need not have any experience of politics or evidence of the insincerity of
politicians for this heuristic to be reliable.
Selective trust, exclusively based on in-group/our-group affiliation (Foddy et al.
2009), can promote successful and responsible inquiry on the basis of a division of
cognitive labour and also by helping us filter quickly, and sometimes reliably, the
information that we receive from others (see e.g. Sperber et al. 2010 on how what they
call ‘epistemic vigilance’ can promote a variety of epistemic goals). Thus, prejudice
need not always hamper our pursuit of epistemic goals. Sometimes, it can actually
foster those goals.
In fact, one might expect that IH reasonably and appropriately generates prejudice
under certain circumstances. In particular, if people who are high in IH also value IH,
then they may be inclined to negatively judge people or social groups they take to be
low in IH. For example, one reason the intellectually humble psychologist does not care
for philosophers is that philosophers are not generally intellectually humble—after all,
many philosophers spend their lives dogmatically defending their own views while
being caustic towards others holding conflicting views. To test this view, one should
focus on the variables “being intellectually humble” and “being prejudiced against
those lacking in intellectual humility.” In our study, we did not measure participants’
beliefs about the level of intellectual humility of members of target groups. But, we can
plausibly predict that, in polarized situations involving in-groups and out-groups, the
intellectually humble in each group will be prejudiced against out-group members for
lacking IH, and will also be prejudiced against members of their own group who are
perceived to be lacking in IH. In-group members who are perceived to be low in IH
might be even more harshly judged than out-group members low in IH, because, for
example, they can and should know better. In such cases, the prejudice would be both
driven by IH and based on judgments about IH (or the lack thereof).
This account could also explain the most puzzling finding in our study, namely that
those high in IH express higher levels of perceived dissimilarity and prejudice across
the board, while at the same time their higher level of IH weakens the dissimilarity-
prejudice association. The basic idea is that those high in IH will tolerate a plurality of
views and values and would not be prejudiced against those views and values.
However, when the groups who hold these views and values are perceived to be low
in IH, this will elicit a higher overall prejudicial response in those high in IH. The
assumptions underlying such a possibility remain to be tested.
This basic idea would shed a new light on the question of whether IH is domain
general or domain specific (or group general or group specific). IH would be a domain-
specific (or group-specific) epistemic virtue only insofar as certain domains of inquiry
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or groups are perceived as lacking humility. The domain (or group) specificity of the
prejudice of people who are high in IH would be driven by humility-related concerns;
and these domains or groups would thus be apt targets of prejudice.
It is important to point out that the account just sketched assumes that it is not the
content of certain views that might elicit prejudice, but the epistemic attitude people
adopt towards those views. So, a person who is high in IH might be less prejudiced
against other people who hold a dissimilar view, but who are perceived as intellectually
humble with respect to that view, than against people who hold a similar view, but are
perceived as arrogant with respect to that view. If this is correct, then our findings might
be driven not by the views associated with target social groups, but by the perceived
epistemic attitudes associated with them. This relates to what one might expect when it
comes to humility buffering the dissimilarity-prejudice association. When the relevant
dissimilarity is with respect to epistemic attitudes towards a view, and not with respect
to the content of the view per se, one might reasonably expect those high in IH to be
prejudiced against precisely those who have different epistemic attitudes—even mem-
bers of their own group. The differences that would matter in these individual and
group level prejudices that are associated with high IH would be the differences
precisely with respect to the presence or absence of IH in a target group. A simple test
of this hypothesis will ask participants to rate their own levels of IH, as we did in our
study. Then, they would be presented with cases of people who have the same or
different views about a certain topic, but with differing levels of IH towards those
views. The prediction is that the prejudice associated with IH tracks judgments about
IH, not judgments about differences between views or groups per se. Another possi-
bility we want to mention about how it may be epistemically rational for people high in
IH to express higher levels of perceived dissimilarity and prejudice across the board,
while at the same time their higher level of IH weakens the dissimilarity-prejudice
association, appeals to a virtue Nietzsche calls “solitude” (Nietzsche 1878/1986).
Solitude is a basic disposition to consider one’s community coldly, taking a critical
attitude towards them, their beliefs, and values. While solitude is closely related to IH
(Alfano forthcoming, Ch. 10.3), it would explain why people high in IH would not
single out groups that they perceive as very dissimilar from them for particular dislike.
Intellectually humble people would dislike everyone equally; and they would be more
honest about their feelings, as they would aim at improving their community through
cultural criticism. Because, similarly to the Nietzschean virtue of solitude, IH “opposes
vices like chauvinism, narrow-mindedness, and cozy cultural smugness” (Alfano
forthcoming, Ch. 1), it would be an important part of cultural critique, and may
promote the attainment of valuable communal epistemic goods.
We have just discussed various testable hypotheses focused on the relationship
between “being IH” and “being prejudiced towards those perceived as low in IH.”
Now, we finally want to focus on the relationship between epistemic culpability and
prejudice. We want to examine whether prejudice is always intellectual vicious,
“epistemically unjust” (Fricker 2007), or “epistemically irrational” (Arpaly 2003) when
directed towards certain social groups one perceives as dissimilar. First of all, Fricker’s
(2007) account of testimonial injustice is specifically concerned with ways in which
prejudice can influence whether people belonging to a certain social groups are
believed when they speak authoritatively. Our results say nothing about whether or
not prejudice systematically produces this deficit in credibility. But, it seems
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psychologically plausible, as well as rationally possible, that people, who feel cold (or
even hate) members of a certain group, will accept their testimony when it is author-
itative. Presumably, being prejudiced towards members of a group is positively corre-
lated with not trusting their testimony, but it is not obvious when this correlation
actually holds, how strong it is, and to what extent IH may attenuate it (for some
suggestive evidence see, e.g., Simon et al. 1970; Stanley et al. 2011).
Begby (2013) argues that some instances of prejudice do not entail any form of
epistemic culpability, understood as a failure to respond to evidence appropriately. His
argument starts by pointing out that the stereotypes constituting prejudices do not have
the form of universal generalizations; instead, they are akin to generic judgements that
are sometimes supported by available evidence, and that are oft accurate, helping us
navigate the social world (Jussim 2012). Some of the generic judgments constituting
prejudices become internalized as background beliefs. When they do, prejudices can
become epistemically insidious, as they “quite reasonably come to control the assess-
ment and interpretation of new evidence” (Begby 2013, 90; for some relevant empirical
evidence see Lord and Taylor 2009). This means that prejudiced individuals will have
different background beliefs than non-prejudiced ones. If they have different back-
ground beliefs, and these background beliefs are borne out by available evidence, then
they “may reasonably differ in their assessment of the significance of new evidence”
(96). The prior stereotypes and attributions constituting the prejudice are used to make
sense of the new evidence, rather than being dismissed on the basis of a few pieces of
contrary evidence. Prejudiced but intellectually humble people, then, may appropriately
attend to all available evidence, and keep holding on to their prejudice without being
epistemically culpable.
One may point out that the epistemic irrationality, in cases where prejudices
become entrenched in our background beliefs, lies “upstream”, in the circum-
stances in which the prejudice was acquired. Begby (2013) explains that some
prejudices become entrenched background beliefs based on support from multiple
sources of evidence. So, again, there need not be anything irrational or culpable in
acquiring a prejudice. This conclusion requires one last qualification, however,
since the epistemic culpability or irrationality may concern not individuals but
social institutions in such a case.
Anderson (2012) focuses her attention to structural forms of epistemic injustice,
and argues that there are social institutions that culpably or irrationally foster
certain prejudices and negative attitudes, for which no particular individual is
epistemically culpable. The most effective remedy in this type of case—suggests
Anderson—is not to stress individual virtues like individuals’ IH; it is rather to
intervene on social institutions and practices of inquiry, which have global prop-
erties that are awry from both an epistemic and moral point of view. One way
Anderson suggests to promote epistemic virtue at the level of global systems of
inquiry is to promote structural integration, where demographically, socially and
epistemically diverse communities “share equally in educational resources and
thus have access to the same (legitimate) markers of credibility” (171). While this
kind of integration would foster epistemic virtue at the level of epistemic systems,
it may prevent individuals’ prejudices or negative affects from issuing in episte-
mically vicious, culpable or irrational discounting of the credibility of a person’s
testimony due to her social identity.
Colombo M. et al.
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